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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C. WESLEY RASMUSSEN and 
DENNIS A. RASMUSSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
WESTERN CASUALTY & 
SURETY COMPANY, 
Defendanl aud Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9892 
RESP·ONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a declaratory judgment action 
brought by respondent C. Wesley Rasmussen, the father 
of respondent Dennis A. Rasmussen, and another son, 
Ronald W. Rasmussen, against Western Casualty and 
Surety Company for a declaration that such persons were 
insured under the terms of a policy issued by the company 
to the father, C. Wesley Rasmussen, with respect to an 
automobile accident that occured in Idaho on August 14, 
1959, in which accident respondent Dennis A. Rasmussen 
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was driving an automobile owned by his brother, Ronald 
W. Rasmussen, and which was furnished to Dennis by 
his father. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Respondents agree with defendant's statement of the 
disposition in the lower court as far as it goes. In fur-
ther explanation, however, they point out that: 
1. They did not move for summary judgment against 
defendant Dale Barton, the agent. 
2. The court did not enter judgment in favor of Ron-
ald W. Rasmussen (the owner of the automobile). Since 
no cross appeal was taken from this adverse ruling, Ron-
ald W. Rasmussen is not a party to this appeal, and was 
improperly designated as a respondent by defendant. 
3. The judgment entered not only requires the defend-
ant to pay any judgments which might be entered against 
respondents but which have already been entered against 
them and in addition to being required to defend actions 
against respondents, the defendant was further required 
to pay all attorney's fees, expenses and costs incurred 
or to be incurred by them in defending such actions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment in their 
favor below. 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and respondents C. Wesley Rasmussen and 
Dennis A. Rasmussen take exception to many of defend-
ant's statements of fact either because they are misstate-
ments or because of omissions or incompleteness. How-
ever, comments will be made only as to those statements 
which are possibly material. Also, many additional facts 
of record are necessary to present the issues properly to 
this Court. 
Defendant. failed to mention item 1 of the policy dec-
larations (Ex. P 1) which stated that the "named in-
sured'' is ''C. Wesley Rasmussen and db a Rasmussen 
Heating and Ventilating Company" and item 2 which 
states "the named insured is INDIVIDUAL." Wesley 
was a sole proprietor (Wesley's deposition p. 5). 
Defendant failed to quote (top page 4 Appellant's 
Brief) that part of item 3 listing coverages as follows: 
"a. Bodily Injury Liability" and "b. Property Damage 
Liability - Automobile,'' and listing specific premium 
charges under the heading "ADVANCE PREMIUMS" 
for both coverages. (Emphasis added) 
The last three pages of the policy (Ex. P 1) in spite 
of the attachment language of item 4 of the policy dec-
larations were not so attached when the policy originally 
issued (R. 36, 37). Although the last page of Ex. P 1, re-
ferred to by appellant as an audit statement (Appellant's 
Brief bottom page 4), says in part, '' G - HIRED AUTO 
-none,'' it was a misstatement for the defendant to say 
the audit sheet indicates there were no hired autos be-
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cause Wesley Rasmussen is quoted at a prior position on 
this sheet as follows : 
not registered in his name 
I 
"Note: insured states that 1-26-59 he took over control 
of his sons 1950 Chev. 2 dr. se-dan. This is the unit 
that was totally wrecked 8-14-59 by another 17 yr 
old son which he states you have a claim pend-
ing on.'' 
Then below the above statement someone from the com-
pany, in pen or pencil, wrote: 
''no charge, claim was denied on basis of no 
coverage per Forrest Carter'' 
The Declaration Schedule attached to the policy (Ex. 
P 1, Form CGA 1112-R4), states certain advance pre-
miums for specific owned automobiles and trucks under 
division 1. Under each of the division headings '' 2. 
HIRED AUTOMOBILES" and "3. NON-OWNED 
AUTOMOBILES" there was typed in by defendant "IF 
ANY." A minimum pemium of "$5.44" and "$1.00" was 
charged for both divisions 2 and 3, as indicated in the 
advance premium columns for Coverages A and B oppo-
site division 3 under the initials "~1: P." This minimum 
pemium was apparently not entered in the box in the 
lower left-hand corner of the page where the minimum 
premium charge should have been entered. The minimum 
premium charge is lumped together for both divisions 2 
and 3, as indicated by the box in the lower left-hand cor-
ner of the Declaration Schedule, which looks as follows: 
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Minimum Premiums : Divisions 2 and 3 
Coverage A - $ 
Coverage B - $ 
At the bottom of this same Declaration Schedule it is 
stated "UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, THE 
PREMIUMS SHOWN HEREIN ARE ESTIMATED 
ANNUAL PREMIUMS.'' 
There was no coverage for products liability and it 
was so stated on the policy instead of quoting a premium 
(Ex. P 1, Item 3 of Declarations). In the Declaration 
Schedule opposite products liability it was stated ''NOT 
COVERED" instead of "IF ANY" (Ex. P 1, Declara-
tion Schedule 6613-122). 
Under Insuring Agreement I defendant failed to 
quote Coverage B as follows : 
''Coverage B - Property Damage Liability -
Automobile 
''To pay on behalf of the insured all sums 
which the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of injury to or destruction 
of property, including the loss of use thereof, 
caused by accident and arising out of the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of any automobile.'' 
(Ex. p 1) 
Defendant failed to quote the following material por-
tions of Insuring Agreement II : 
''II. Defense, Settlement, Supplementary Pay-
ments 
5 
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"With respect to such insurance as is afforded 
by this policy, the company shall : 
(a) defend any suit against the insured alleging 
such injury, sickness, disease or destruction 
and seeking damages on account thereof, even 
if such suit is groundless, false or fraudu-
lent; ... 
(b) (2) pay all expenses incurred by the company, 
all costs taxed against the insured in any such 
suit and all interest accruing after entry of 
judgment until the company has paid or ten-
dered or deposited in court such part of such 
judgment as does not exceed the limit of the 
company's liability thereon; ... 
and the amounts so incurred, except settlements of 
claims and suits, are payable by the company in 
addition to the applicable limit of liability of this 
policy.'' 
Defendant either mistakenly, or intentionally, but in 
any event, erroneously refers to "division (2)" of In-
suring Agreement III as "subdivision 2" (sic) (middle 
page 5 Appellant's Brief). 
The rna terial portions of Insuring Agreement III 
(deleting immaterial portions) read as follows: 
''III. Definition of Insured 
"The unqualified word 'insured' includes the 
named insured and also includes ... (2) under 
coverages A and B, any person while using an 
owned automobile or a hired automobile and any 
person or organization legally responsible for the 
use thereof, provided the actual use of the automo-
bile is by the named insured or with his per-
. . '' IDISSlOn •••• 
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No exclusions in the policy apply to the facts of this 
case nor does the defendant so claim. 
Defendant misstated item 1 of the conditions (mid-
dle page 6 Appellant's Brief) by not quoting in full as 
follows: 
"1. Premium The premium bases and rates 
for the hazards described in the declarations are 
stated therein. Premium bases and rates for haz-
ards not so described are those applicable in ac-
cordance with the manuals in use by the com-
pany.'' 
Item I of the conditions further states : 
''The advance premium stated in the declara-
tions is an estimated premium only. Upon termi-
nation of this policy, the earned premium shall be 
computed in accordance with the company's rules, 
rates, rating plans, premiums and minimum pre-
miums applicable to this insurance. If the earned 
premium thus computed exceeds the estimated ad-
vance premium paid, the named insured shall pay 
the excess to the company; if less, the company 
shall return to the named insured the unearned 
portion paid by such insured ... (deleting defi-
nitions of terms used as a premium basis).'' 
Pertinent automobile definitions are contained in 
item 3 (b) of the Conditions, as follows: 
"(b) Automobile. Except where stated to the 
contrary, the word 'automobile' means a land mo-
tor vehicle or trailer as follows : 
(1) Owned Automobile - an automobile owned 
by the named insured ; 
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(2) Hired Automobile - an automobile used un-
der contract in behalf of, or loaned to, the 
named insured provided such automobile is 
not owned by or registered in the name of (a) 
the named insured or (b) an executive officer 
thereof or (c) an employee or agent of the 
named insured who is granted an operating 
allowance of any sort for the use of such 
automobile; 
(3) Non-Owned Automobile- any other automo-
bile.'' 
Defendant has made no claim that the conditions of 
the policy have not been met. 
Ronald was not living at home with his parents at 
the time the policy was written, as defendant states (first 
full paragraph page 7, Appellant's Brief). Ronald left 
for his mission on January 26, 1959 (Ronald's deposition 
p. 35). The policy commenced April1, 1959 (Ex. P 1, item 
2 declarations). Ronald did not recall leaving any insur-
ance papers with his father (Ronald's deposition, p. 38), 
as defendant states on page 7 of its brief. Wesley did not 
recall receiving renewal papers (Wesley's deposition p. 
27) contrary to what defendant states on page 7 of its 
brief. At all times Ronald was on his mission he was to 
be the owner of the car but his father was to have control 
of it (Ronald's deposition p. 39). 
Pursuant to the so-called ''audit'' procedure of the 
company or agent, Mr. Barton or another man would 
either call Wesley Rasmussen or visit him every spring 
and audit the payroll. They would ask questions (Wes-
ley's deposition, p. 8). If comple,te information was not 
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obtained, there would be a telephone conference. The 
only audits submitted were payroll audits (Wesley's 
deposition p. 9). The so-called "audits" were not accu-
rate since a 1939 Ford stake truck was not eliminated 
until1959 when, actually, Wesley had sold it years before 
(Wesley's deposition p. 19 and Ex. D 2). Also, the so-
called audit for the period commencing 4-1-59 (the last 
sheet Ex. P 1) dated 5-11-60 deleted a 1947 Chev. panel for 
the full term whereas the prior year's "audit" (Ex. D 2) 
dated 4-27-59, purported to delete the same 1947 Chev. 
panel for the full preceding term. The April 1959 audit 
(Ex. D 2) added for the first time a 1957 Chev. half ton 
pickup purchased two years earlier (Wesley's deposition, 
p. 20). Wesley never listed the vehicles on an audit. Bar-
ton sent the audit out to sign C'N esley's deposition, p. 
20). Barton only audited the payroll. Barton only called 
to ask about automobiles sometimes (Wesley's deposi-
tion, p. 20, 21). Wesley did not remember Barton calling 
to ask about his son's auto "about that time" (audit 
time) (Wesley's deposition, p. 21). Wesley testified: 
"At the time Dale Barton sold me the policy 
he told me that any car borrowed or rented or any 
car that was in my possession was covered by 
that policy . . . He told me I was fully covered, 
no matter whether borrowed or rented or if it was 
a friend's car, I was fully covered on any car that 
me or my family was driving." (Wesley's deposi-
tion p. 22) 
Dale Barton talked to Wesley's wife about vehicles 
on hand (Barton's letter, Wesley's deposition p. 11, 12, 
quoted in Appellant's Brief, pages 10 and 11), even 
though Wesley said the only way to get information about 
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cars was from himself and not his wife (vVesley's depo-
sition, p. 25). Wesley did not admit receiving this type 
of letter after each audit as stated by defendant in its 
brief at page 11. He admitted that "if Dale Barton had 
any questions,'' he would either communicate or give to 
Wesley similar to what was in the letter (Wesley's depo-
sition, p. 12). 
Dennis and his twin brother were not working in 
Idaho for the summer, as stated by appellant in its brief 
at page 11. Wesley said the period they were working 
may have been a week or two or longer (Wesley's deposi-
tion, p. 17). Dennis left home to go to Idaho on or about 
July 28, 1959 (R. 20). Dennis and his brother made a trip 
or two back home from Idaho prior to the accident (Wes-
ley's deposition p. 30). 
No judgment was rendered against C. Wesley Ras-
mussen in the Idaho action (Ex. P 4) because the Idaho 
court held service upon Wesley was improper (R. 40, 42). 
Respondents in their amended complaint made alle-
gation against Dale Barton only in the alternative as 
follows: 
''. . . that a dispute has arisen between plain-
tiff and defendant as to whether or not the acci-
dent herein referred to was covered by the terms 
of said insurance agreement; that it is the conten-
tion of the defendant that said accident is not 
within the coverage of said policy because the 
vehicle involved was not included on a certain 
schedule of vehicles prepared by defendants; that 
it is the contention of plaintiffs that such omission 
is not material to the issue of coverage, but if it 
is material, then defendant Dale Barton was neg-
10 
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ligent in failing to include such vehicle on said 
schedule; and that if by the terms of the insurance 
agreement the accident is not within the coverage 
of said policy as to the plaintif C. Wesley Rasmus-
sen for any other reason, it is due to the negli-
gence of defendant Dale Barton in that said 
defendant represented to said plaintiff that said 
insurance agreement insured said plaintiff and 
members of his family against any accident what-
ever." (R. 3, 4) 
The record, unfortunately, does not contain the argu-
ments of counsel (R. 45) just previous to Judge Ellett's 
tongue-in-cheek comments (R. 45) quoted by appellant in 
its brief on page 14. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SUBPOINTS A AND B OF DEFENDANT'S 
ARGUMENT ARE ENTIRELY MISDIRECT-
ED TO THIS COURT. 
The only issues presented by this appeal are issues 
of coverage under the policy as to respondents only. If 
coverage exists, defendant has a duty to defend respond-
ents (Ex. P 1, Insuring Agreement II), and a duty to pay 
judgments, if any, entered against respondents (Ex. P 1, 
Insuring Agreement I). 
A. WHETHER OR NOT WESLEY IS, OR 
MAY ULTIMATELY BE FOUND, LIABLE IN 
DAMAGES FOR THE ACCIDENT IN QUES-
TION IS NOT A PROPER ISSUE FOR THIS 
COURT TO DECIDE. 
11 
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It is well established that the insurer's duty to de-
fend does not depend upon the insurer's ultimate liabil-
ity to pay. Anno. 50 ALR 2d 458, 475 et seq (1956) and 
cases discussed therein. 
The obligation of the Insurer to defend an action 
brought against the insured is to be determined by the 
allegations of the complaint regardless of the actual out-
come of the case (assuming that the policy otherwise 
affords coverage to the insured). Anno. 50 ALR 2d 458, 
465-71 ( 1956) and cases discussed therein. The com-
plaints (Ex. P 3, 4 and 5) allege facts within policy cov-
erage, namely, death, bodily injury and property damage. 
The complaints do not allege any facts that would ex-
clude policy coverage. 
Defendant spent over six pages in subpoint A of its 
brief making an elaborate conflict of laws argument that 
it should be making to the District Court in Hatch v. 
Rasmussen. See Ex. P 5. The argument only goes to 
the question of ultimate liability, not policy coverage. 
Apparently defendant claims that if Wesley cannot be 
found ultimately liable, there is no coverage. In effect, 
this amounts to the insurer telling its insured: "You 
cannot possibly be found negligent. No judgment can be 
entered against you, and we, therefore, deny coverage. 
Go defend yourself. If a judgment should he entered 
against you, tough luck.'' Defendant's argument never 
reaches the only issues before the Court : Was there cov-
erage under the policy for Wesley and Dennis~ 
It is a well accepted judicial precept, not requiring 
the citation of precedent, that a court should not pass 
12 
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upon issues not raised or before it, and that a court 
should not pass upon issues affecting parties who are not 
before the court. To illustrate the mischief that would 
follow if this Court were to rule in defendant's favor, 
based upon defendant's argument that Idaho and not 
Utah law should apply, or that liability will not be im-
puted to \V esley, the following consequences would or 
could result. 
1. The ruling would become res adjudica.ta against 
respondents. 
2. But the ruling would not bind the Hatches, who 
are plaintiffs in the pending suit against respondents in 
the District Court, since they are not parties to this 
action. 
3. Respondents would still be required to defend 
themselves in the Hatch suit and possibly even other 
suits. See Ex. P 4, Kersavage, et al v. Wesley Rasmus-
sen. In this latter Idaho action no jurisdiction was ob-
tained over Wesley in Idaho. Such jurisdiction may still 
be obtained in Utah. 
4. Respondents might not prevail in such suits be-
cause the District Court may not follow the law defend-
ant so glibly cites in its brief. 
5. On an appeal from the latter suits this Court, 
with all of the proper and neceessa.ry parties before it 
and with the issues presented differently, might wish 
that it had not ruled prematurely on the conflicts question 
on this appeal. 
13 
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6. If this Court reversed its ruling on the Hatch v. 
Rasmussen appeal, respondents would have to pay the 
judgments but could not look to the insurance company 
because of res adjudicata. 
7. In any event, respondents would be out of pocket 
without reimbursement for the expenses heretofore in-
curred in defending the various suits and for the expenses 
they would subsequently incur in defending them. The 
insuring agreement to defend respondents would be 
emasculated. 
Respondents should not be placed in a position where 
they can be whiplashed. They should not be required to 
defend any suit if coverage exists. Above all, they should 
not be compelled to cite law on the other side of defend-
ant's ultimate liability authorities, when, if coverage 
should not exist, respondents' o·wn research, labor and 
arguments may be turned against them at the trial. This 
Court should not prematurely, in the wrong action, con-
sider the issue of ultimate liability. 
B. RONALD RASMUSSEN'S COVERAGE 
IS NOT AN ISSUE ON THIS APPEAL. 
Ronald is not a respondent or party to this appeal. 
The trial judge ruled against Ronald for the very rea-
son cited in the defendant's brief and Ronald did not 
appeal from that adverse ruling. Respondents agee that 
the vehicle was a hired vehicle, that Ronald was the 
owner and that Section III ( 2) (d) of the Insuring Agree-
ments excluded him as an insured under the policy. 
14 
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POINT II. 
WESLEY RASMUSSEN, AS THE "NAMED 
INSURED'', WAS COVERED WITH REGARD 
TO THE ACCIDENT IN QUESTION REGARD-
LESS OF WHETHER OR NOT THE VEI-IICLE 
INVOLVED WAS A "HIRED AUTOMOBILE". 
Whether or not the vehicle was a ''hired a utomo-
bile" does not affect Wesley's coverage but defendant's 
brief appears to proceed upon the assumption that it 
does. Under the policy additional but unneeded insur-
ance is afforded to Wesley if the vehicle was in fact a 
hired automobile, but this point of respondent's brief is 
directed to Wesley's basis of coverage apart from the 
hired automobile coverage. In refuting subpoints A 
and B of Appellant's Brief respondent Wesley Ras-
mussen should have established his coverage since de-
fendant's only remaining point concerns the "hired Au-
tomobile" question. Under this point of this brief (in-
cluding Subpoint A) respondents are required, however, 
to refute several unrelated arguments scattered through-
out defendant's brief like grape shot. The Court's in-
dulgence is requested. 
Insuring Agreement Number I, Coverage A, obli-
gates defendant to pay damages on behalf of the ''in-
sured" because of bodily injury caused by accident (Ex. 
P 1). There is no reference whatever to, or limitation 
based upon, any specific vehicle, or driver. Coverage B 
of Insuring Agreement Number I is similar with regard 
to property damage caused by accident but adds ''arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of amy vehicle" 
15 
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(emphasis added). Again there is no limitation to a spe-
cific vehicle. The agreement even says ''any vehicle'' 
and is not limited to any driver. 
Insuring Agreement II obligates the company to 
''defend arn,y suit aginst the insured, alleging such injury, 
sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on 
account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false, or 
fraudulent; ... " (emphasis added). Again there is no 
limitation to any specific vehicle or driver whatever. 
Insuring Agreement III defines the all-important 
term "insured." It says "the unqualified word 'insured' 
includes the named insured ... '' As far as Wesley is con-
cerned, the policy need not be read any further. N oth-
ing else contained is necessary for Wesley's coverage as 
the ''named insured.'' The balance of Insuring Agree-
ment III merely goes on to state who else and under what 
circumstances can be deemed to be an ''insured.'' 
With one exception, defendant has not claimed, nor 
could it, that any exclusion, condition or other term of 
the policy would take away the all-encompassing cover-
age granted to Wesley by the insuring agreements (sub-
ject, of course, to policy limitations of liability). Defend-
ant does, at pages 30 and 31, under subpoint C (3) of its 
brief, claim that Insuring Agreement III (e) excludes 
Wesley. Defendant surely knows its own policy better 
than to refer to a subparagraph completely out of eontext 
and misrepresent its import. The material portion of 
Insuring Agreement III which precedes subparagraph 
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(e) and subparagraph (e) should be read together as 
follows: 
''III. Definition of Insured 
The unqualified word 'insured' includes the 
named insured and also includes . . . ( 2) under 
coverages A and B, any person while using an 
owned automobile or a hired automobile and any 
person or organization legally responsible for the 
use thereof, provided the actual use of the auto-
mobile is by the named insured or with his per-
mission, ... The insurance with respect to any 
person or organization other than the named in~ 
sured does not apply under division (2) of this 
insuring agreement ... 
(e) With respect to any non-owned automo-
bile, to any executive officer if such auto-
roo bile is owned by him or a member of the 
same household.'' (Emphasis added) 
The emphasized language conclusively establishes 
that subparagraph (2) (e) does not exclude the named 
insured. Defendant's argument would have merit if: (1) 
the named insured were a corporation and Wesley were 
its President (instead of being the named insured) ; ( 2) 
Wesley was only an "insured" under division (2); and, 
(3) Ronald was a member of Wesley's household. In the 
first place, Wesley, as the named insured, is an insured 
by reason of the first line of Insuring Agreement III 
and the limiting provisions (alphabetical paragraphs) of 
division (2), applicable only to division (2), could not 
apply. Secondly, the emphasized phrase ''other than the 
named insured'' means that the additional insurance af-
forded to Wesley under division (2) is not affected by 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the limiting provisions (alphabetical paragraphs) of di- ji! 
vision (2). Finally, although it is immaterial whether or ;~u 
not Ronald was a member of Wesley's household, the /;u1 
following authorities establish clearly he was not and line 
defendant's argument would fail even if Wesley were :srr 
deemed to be an executive officer instead of the named 
insured. Isla;nd v. Firema;ns Fund Indem. Co., 30 Cal. 
2d 541, 184 P. 2d 153, 173 ALR 896 (1947) and Shapiro v. 
Republic In.dem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 437, 341 P. 2d 289 (1959), 
involved sons in the armed forces at the time of the 
accident, one of whom was a minor. Both cases held 
the sons were not members of the insureds' household. A 
''household'' means those living together under one roof, 
under one head, under control of one person. Boyd v. 
Peoples Protective Life Ins. Co., 208 Tenn. 280, 345 S.W. 
2d 869 (1961). The word "household" means those 
who dwell under the same roof and compose a family. 
Kelso v. Kelso, 306 S.W. 2d 534,536 (Mo.), 71ALR2d 258. 
See also, Anno. 173 ALR 896 (1947). 
A. THE VEHICLE WOULD NOT HAVE 
TO BE LISTED IN THE DECLARATION 
SCHEDULE FOR COVERAGE TO EXIST 
AND IT WAS PICKED UP IN AN AUDIT. 
Defendant states that Wesley and Dennis were not 
covered, claiming that Ronald's car was not listed in the 
declaration schedule or was not picked up in a subsequent 
audit. (Appellant's Brief p. 14, 15 and subpoint C (1) 
p. 27) 
Pursuant to the so-called ''audit'' procedure of the 
company or agent, Mr. Barton or another man would 
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either call Wesley Rasmussen or visit him every spring 
and audit the payroll. They would ask questions (W es-
ley's deposition, p. 8). If complete information was not 
obtained, there would be a telephone conference. The 
only audits submitted were payroll audits (Wesley's depo-
sition p. 9). The so-called "audits" were not accurate 
since a 1939 Ford stake truck was not eliminated until 
1959 ·when, actually, Wesley had sold it years before 
(Wesley's deposition p. 19 and Ex. D 2). Also, the so-
called audit for the period commencing 4-1-59 (the last 
sheet Ex. P 1) dated 5-11-60 deleted a 1947 Chev. panel 
for the full term whereas the prior year's "audit" (Ex. 
D 2) dated 4-27-59, purported to delete the same 1947 
Chev. panel for the full preceding term. The April 1959 
"audit" (Ex. D 2) added for the first time a 1957 Chev. 
half-ton pickup purchased two years earlier (Wesley's 
deposition, p. 20). Wesley never listed the vehicles on 
an audit. Barton sent the audit out to sign (Wesley's 
deposition, p. 20). Barton only audited the payroll. Bar-
ton called to ask about automobiles only sometimes (Wes-
ley's deposition, p. 20, 21). Wesley did not remember 
Barton calling to ask about his son's auto "about that 
time" (audit time) (Wesley's deposition, p. 21). Wesley 
testified: 
''At the time Dale Barton sold me the policy he 
told me that any car borrowed or rented or any car 
that was in my possession was covered by that 
policy ... He told me I was fully covered, no rna t-
ter whether borrowed or rented or ·if it was a 
friend's car, I was fully covered on any car that 
me or my family was driving." (Wesley's deposi-
tion, p. 22) 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Dale Barton talked to Wesley's wife about vehicles 
on hand (Barton's letter, Wesley's deposition p. 11, 12, 
quoted in Appellant's Brief, pages 10 and 11), even 
though Wesley said the only way to get information 
about cars was from himself and not his wife (Wesley's 
deposition, p. 25). Wesley did not admit receiving this 
type of letter after each audit as stated by defendant in its 
brief at page 11. He admitted that "if Dale Barton had 
any questions," he would either communicate or give to 
Wesley similar to what was in the letter (Wesley's depo-
sition, p. 12, emphasis added). Dale Barton's letter said: 
'' ... Would you please send the serial number 
to me, and call me collect if you desire this office 
to investigate further the coverage of the vehicles. 
The coverage I refer to is the collision and com-
prehensive on any of the vehicles yo~t own ... 
(Emphasis added) 
Instead of suggesting to Wesley that he should be 
concerned about non-owned or hired vehicles, the letter 
would have the opposite effect. All Barton inquired about 
was coverage on ''any of the vehicles you own.'' 
These loose procedures result only in a matter of 
premium adjustment. The fact remains that the policy in 
question is an audit type policy and an unusually broad 
form of coverage policy at that. Premiums due, if any, 
are picked up on an audit. The initial premium is desig-
nated only as an "advance premium". The declaration 
schedule states "UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED, 
THE PREMIUMS SHOWN HEREIN ARE ESTIMAT-
ED ANNUAL PREMIUMS'' (Ex. P 1 Declaration 
20 
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Schedule). Coverage exists whether or not the full pre-
mium is paid in advance. 
At page 26 of defendant's brief defendant sets up 
and knocks over a ridiculous straw man when it states: 
''. . . If this vehicle be considered as a hired 
vehicle under the policy, then the insured, Wesley 
Rasmussen, was having two family cars and only 
paying a premium on one. This line of reason-
ing, if followed to its logical conclusion, could lead 
to some rather absurd results. For instance, each 
of the three Rasmussen boys could own cars ; each 
could loan the car to his father for the entire pol-
icy period, the father could let another son drive 
each car during the entie policy period and under 
the court's interpretation in such event all of the 
driver's and the insured would be covered on all 
three vehicles as well as the insured's own private 
passenger cars for the entire period of the policy. 
We submit that rio such absurd result was ever 
intended or should be considered by this court.'' 
Respondents agree that no such absurd result was 
intended or should be considered. An advance minimum 
premium was charged for hired and non-owned vehicles 
in the amount of $5.44 for Coverage A and $1.00 for 
Coverage B (Declaration Schedule Ex. P 1). The initials 
":JI P" inserted above each of the dollar amounts 
"5.44" and "$1.00", respectively, in the advance pre-
mium columns "Coverage A" and "Coverage B", re-
spectively, of the Declaration Schedule, obviously mean 
"minimum premium" since no non-owned or hired auto-
mobiles were listed, described or disclosed. That the 
minimum premium is aggregated for both vehicle classi-
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fications is clear from the box in the lower left-hand cor-
ner of the schedule which appears as follows: 
Minimum Premiums: Divisions 2 and 3 
Coverage A- $ 
Coverage B - $ 
Divisions 2 and 3 refer to hired automobiles and non-
owned automobiles. Apparently, the figures were inserted 
in the advance premium columns, but not in the box. To 
say that no premium was charged ignores the facts. A 
minimum premium was charged for hired vehicles and 
non-owned vehicles even though an audit might never 
pick up usage of such vehicles. If an audit does pick up 
such vehicle usage, additional premiums are due. The 
policy says : 
"1. Premium The premium bases and rates 
for the hazards described in the declarations are 
stated therein. Premium bases and rates for haz-
ards not so described are those applicable in ac-
cordance with the manuals in use by the company. 
''The advance premium stated in the declara-
tions is an estimated premium only. Upon termi-
nation of this policy the earned premium shall 
be computed in accordance with the company's 
rules, rates, rating plans, premiums and mini-
mum premiums applicable to this insurance. If 
the earned premium thus computed exceeds the 
estimated advance premium paid, the named in-
sured shall pay the excess to the company. If less, 
the company shall return to the named insured 
the unearned portion paid by such insured.'' (Item 
I of Conditions, Ex. P 1) 
Although Section 6 of item 1 of the conditions makes 
cost of hire a basis for premium, it is only one basis for 
22 
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a premium charge. The company, as above quoted, uses 
its manuals, rules, rates, rating plans, etc., in determin-
ing premiums, premium bases and rates for hazards not 
so described. The use of the manuals, rules, rates, etc., 
would clearly apply to a "loaned automobile" when no 
hire charge is paid therefor and the vehicle is not de-
scribed. The phrase "IF ANY" would not appear in the 
non-owned and hired vehicles divisions of the declara-
tions schedule if the company did not intend to charge 
additional premium in addition to the minimum premium 
which it did charge. Even if it he argued that no addi-
tional premium could be charged, the fact remains that a 
minimum premium was charged. 
Defendant, in its brief at the top of page 15, says 
that after the effective date of the policy audits "did not 
disclose any other passenger vehicles to be covered by 
the policy." At page 27 of its brief, defendant states that 
the vehicle was not indicated on any of the audit sheets. 
If a "hired automobile" includes a "loaned automobile", 
as stated by the definition of "hired automobile" (see 
Point III of this brief), what, we submit, does the follow-
ing statement on the audit sheet dated 5-11-60, which de-
fendant claims is part of the policy (R. 36-38), disclose~ 
not registered in his name 
I 
"Insured states that 1-26-59 he took over control 
----
of his son's 1950 Chev. Tudor Sedan. This is the 
unit that was totally wrecked 8-14-59 by another 
17 year old son which he states you have a claim 
pending on.'' 
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The above statement reveals that Wesley took over 
control, not ownership. It revealed that the car was not 
registered in Wesley's name. It revealed that the car be-
longed to a son and that control was taken on the date the 
son left for a mission. All the elements of a loan were 
established. 
The audit sheet attached to the policy itself clearly 
discloses and picks up "a hired automobile" in fact, if 
not expressly. The respondents are not bound by de-
fendant's own self-serving statement subsequently con-
tained on the audit sheet, "hired automobile-none". The 
latter expression, made by the company after it already 
noted the earlier quoted statement of the insured, is 
sophistry or chicanery or both. 
Respondents submit that if no accident had occurred, 
defendant would have insisted upon payment of addi-
tional premium for Ronald's car. That Wesley may haYe 
overlooked advising the company about Ronald's car is 
immaterial with an audit type policy when, in fact, the 
audit disclosed the exposure. Wesley should not be asked 
to suffer the consequences of the haphazard and comical 
audit procedure conducted by the company or its agent 
when, in fact, an audit of the applicable policy period dis-
closed the risk. 
It is most significant that the company noted in hand-
writing, after the audit disclosure, "No charge, claim was 
denied on basis of no coverage .... '' (Ex. P 1 last sheet, ·~ 
emphasis added). Can the company avoid coverage by l'atiOI 
conveniently saying so? The statement is proof that a ~ 
charge was considered. But after consideration, and be-
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cause of the claim, the company obviously preferred to 
make no charge. 
Defendant keeps repeating throughout its brief that 
the car involved was not insured under the policy, but its 
only authority is a quotation from a meager text that 
"the insured automobile" must be involved (Appel-
lant's Brief, p. 15). No meaningful case with flesh and 
bones analogous facts could be cited by defendant. To 
pose the quetion whether or not a person is insured or 
an accident is insured or a vehicle is insured is only a play 
upon words. If the person and the accident are insured, 
of necessity the vehicle involved is insured. If the ve-
hicle is insured, so is the accident and the person involved. 
Defendant would have the Court believe there is no 
coverage unless the vehicle is listed in a declaration. A 
few illustrations point out the fallacy of this approach. 
The policy would have provided coverage to the named 
insured had he been driving any non-owned vehicle. In-
suring Agreement III states that the ''insured'' includes 
executive officers driving non-owned vehicles in certain 
circumstances. Obviously, most non-owned vehicles can-
not be listed in a declaration. The policy also clearly cov-
ers certain persons (in addition to the named insured) 
for use of hired vehicles if such use is with the permission 
of the named insured. If anyone had driven a hired 
vehicle with Wesley's permission, he or she would be 
covered even though the same was not listed in the dec-
laration. By its very nature an audit type policy covers 
vehicles not listed. Why, if Wesley would have been 
covered driving a;n,y non-owned vehicle, is he not covered 
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when his liability is imputed? In other words, Wesley 
had coverage if his son drove any vehicle. The minimum 
premium charge covers the exposure to vehicle use that 
will or does not get picked up on audit. 
The only authority defendant cites for the proposi-
tion that imputed liability is not covered is an obscure 
case (page 21 Appellant's Brief) involving readily dis-
tinguishable and entirely different facts. The Court was 
considering the meaning of a statute with far different 
language than the policy before this Court. See Fazzino 
v. Insurance Co. of North America., 152 Cal. App 2d 304, 
313 P 2d 178, for a case that held a father's imputed lia-
bility was covered when the minor son drove a non-
owned vehicle. The policy was a different kind of policy 
than the one before this Court but the method of construc-
tion is the same urged by Respondents herein. If any-
thing, this policy is clearer for the father's coverage than 
the policy in the Fazzino case. 
Defendant cannot seek to avoid its responsibility by 
claiming it relied upon the absence of the vehicle listing 
in the declaration, because this type of policy is intended 
to cover undisclosed risks. Respondents have pointed out 
that a minimum premium was paid for the coverage and 
that the company was entitled to seek additional pre- ;qr 
mium. Indeed, the lower court, in its judgment, reserved "" 
for trial the question of the amount of premium, if any, 
that may be due defendant from plaintiffs, or any of 
them (R. 29). The very coverage in question was contem-
plated by the <?ompany and was disclosed by audit. 
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Although the result would have been the same for 
Wesley had the car been a non-owned automobile instead 
of a hired automobile, as we will point out subsequently, 
because the vehicle was a hired automobile it is clear 
beyond doubt that the company is responsible for W es-
ley's imputed liability by virtue of the provisions of 
division (2) of Insuring Agreement III. The policy states 
two independent grounds of coverage as to Wesley. 
POINT III. 
RONALD RASMUSSEN'S CAR WAS A 
"HIRED AUTOMOBILE" WITHIN THE 
~lEANING OF THE POLICY. 
This brief has previously demonstrated that the risk 
of this vehicle was contemplated in the policy, that the 
Yehicle was disclosed in an audit sheet factually, if not 
expressly, as a "hired automobile," and that Wesley was 
not excluded by subparagraph (2) (e) of Insuring Agree-
ment III, thereby refuting subpoints C (1) and (3) of 
Appellant's Brief. 
In subpoint C (2) of Appellant's Brief, defendant 
claims Ronald and Wesley did not consider the vehicle 
to be a hired vehicle within the meaning of the policy. 
The correct policy term is "hired automobile", not "ve-
hicle". Admittedly, the previous policy on Ronald's car 
lapsed after he left home. At the time the insurance 
agreement, the policy in issue here, was entered into and 
thereafter until after the accident occurred, it could prob-
ably be said that neither Ronald nor Wesley gave the 
vehicle any thought at all with regard to defendant's pol-
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icy. At the bottom of page 29 of Appellant's Brief, de-
fendant erroneously and without a record citation, states 
that "\V esley indicated to Dale Barton he did not have any 
hired vehicles. Correctly stated, Wesley did not indicate 
he had a hired vehicle (until after the accident occurred). 
The audit made in the spring of 1959 was for the pol-
icy period ending March 31, 1959. The audit was not 
made for the new policy for the current year already in 
effect, the policy that is before this Court. The defend-
ant may have a claim under the prior policy for premiums 
from January 26, 1959, when Ronald left home, until 
the end of the policy term on March 31, 1959. But the 
spring 1959 audit did not pick this up. Incidentally, re-
spondent Wesley Rasmussen may have a claim against 
the company for overcharges on vehicles that should 
have been deleted earlier, but in any event, the previous 
policy is not even before this Court or in issue. The next 
spring audit, dated 5-11-60, auditing the policy that is 
before this Court, did pick up the "hired automobile." 
Indeed, the company was advised about the vehicle after 
the accident in August, 1959. 
Subpoint C (2) of Appellant's Brief is meaningless 
because no one knows what Wesley "thought". We do 
know that Dale Barton told Wesley he "was fully cov-
ered, no matter whether borrowed or rented or if it was 
a friend's car, I was fully covered on any car that me 
or my family was driving." (Wesley's deposition p. 22). 
Plainly, "\Vesley did· not consider the meaning of the 
te-chnical term· "hired automobile", an unusual phrase 
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of art with an unusual legal meaning. Defendant has 
cited no authority or any policy provisions that would 
indicate that what Wesley may or may not have thought 
has any bearing upon whether or not the vehicle was in 
fact a hired automobile. 
All that remains to be discussed with regard to sub-
point C of Appellant's Brief is the definition of "hired 
automobile". 
The policy defines Hired Automobile as follows: 
"(b) (2) Hired Automobile - an automobile used 
under contract in behalf of, or loaned to, 
the named insured provided such auto-
mobile is not owned by or registered in 
the name of (a) the named insured or 
(b) an executive officer thereof or (c) an 
employee or agent of the named insured 
who is granted an operating allowance 
of any sort for the use of such automo-
bile;" (Ex. P 1, Item 3, Conditions) 
The automobile was loaned by Ronald W. Rasmus-
sen to his father. At ail times Ronald was on his mission 
he was to be the owner of the car but his father was to 
have control of it (Ronald's deposition, p. 39). The 
word "loan" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: 
''A bailment without reward; consisting of the 
delivery of an article by the owner to another per-
son to be used by the latter gratuitously and re-
turned either in specie or in kind.'' 
The word "loan" is defined in Webster's New Inter-
national Dictionary, Second Edition, Unabridged, 1946, 
as the ''act of lending; a lending ; permission to use ... '' 
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In Peters v. Thompson, 42 So. 2d 91 (Fla.) the court 
held that a "loan" of a chattel is a bailment thereof for 
the borrower's use without paying therefor or bailment 
without reward, consisting of delivery of an article by 
the owner to another for use by the bailee gratuitously 
and returned to the owner in specie or in kind. 
In Industrial Lumber Co. v. Strickland, 30 S.E. 2d 
792, 71 Ga. App. 298, the court held that a loan is a bail-
ment of an article for a certain time, to be used by the 
borrower without paying for its use, and the borrower is 
bound to take good care of the thing borowed, to use it 
according to the intention of the lender, to restore it at a 
proper time and in proper condition. 
In Cherry v. Mitosky, 353 Pa. 401, 45 A. 2d 23, the 
court defined the loan of a chattel as a bailment without 
reward, consisting of delivery of an article by the owner 
to another person to be used by the latter gratuitously 
and returned either in specie or in kind. 
Contrary to what defendant states, it is not undis-
puted that no premium was paid on Ronald's car. The 
minimum premium must be deemed to have applied 
against just such a useage. Since we have previously 
pointed out that the company could have charged an 
additional premium upon the vehicle if it were a "hired 
automobile," the only remaining question raised by 
defendant in its brief is whether or not a loan must be 
''temporary'' and what the meaning of ''temporary'' 
may be. 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
From the policy commencement on April 1, 1959, 
until the accident on August 14, 1959, was a period of 
only four and one-half months. From the time Ronald 
left home until the accident was only six and one-half 
months. The policy term was only one year. From the 
time Ronald left home until he returned from his mission 
was only two years. 
We have just cited authorities that did not include 
the term ''temporary'' in definitions of a loan. Even if 
it be conceded, however, which respondents do not so con-
cede, that a loan must be "temporary", defendant's quot-
ed definitions (pp. 24, 25, appellant's brief) do not defeat 
coverage. Four and one-half months or six and one-half 
months or even one or two years ''lasts for a time only'', 
''exists or continues for a limited time,'' ''is not of long 
duration". Four and one-half months or six and one-
half months or even one or two years is definitely "not 
permanent but is transitory". What is long or short is 
all relative and these terms in and of themselves require 
definition. Defendant cites no authority whatever that 
a loan of an automobile could not continue for a period 
of one or two years. 
In Richards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 55 P. 2d 
1067, 184 Wash. 595, the court held that the words "per-
manent" and "temporary" are antonyms of each other, 
and readily occur to the ordinary mind as such. 
In Little v. Safeguard Insurarnce Co., La. App., 137 
So. 2d 415, 419, the court held that the term ''temporary'' 
within the meaning of an automobile liability policy ''tern-
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porary substitute'' provision has no fixed meaning in the 
sense of designating any fixed period of time, but is used 
in contradistinction to "permanent". 
Without citing further authorities, the Court's atten-
tion is directed to the definitions of "temporary" at 
pages 263-265, et seq, and pages 87-89 of the pocket part 
of Words and Phrases, Volume 41. Several pages of case 
digests, over thirty in number, state that "temporary" 
is the antonym of ''permanent''. In this light, there-
fore, there is no doubt that the loaning of the automobile 
was "temporary" because it is clear that four and one-
half months or six and one-half months or even one or 
two years is not permanent. 
POINT IV. 
WESLEY RASMUSSEN AND DENNIS A. 
RASMUSSEN WERE BOTH AN ''INSURED'' 1~;, 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF DIVISION (2) 
OF INSURING AGREEMENT III. 
The material portions of Insuring Agreement III and 
division (2) thereof read as follows: 
''The unqualified word 'insured' includes the 
named insured and also includes ... (2) under cov-
erages A and B, any person while using an owned 
automobile or a hired automobile and any person 
or organzation legally responsible for the use 
thereof, provided the actual use of the automo-
bile is by the named insured or with his permis-
sion, ... (Emphasis added) 
U nl~e. Wesley, who was the named insured, Dennis 
would not achieve coverage under the .policy unless the 
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vehicle was a ''hired automobile'' within the meaning 
of the policy. There is no question that the actual use of 
the vehicle by Dennis A. Rasmussen was with the per-
mission of the named insured, C. Wesley Rasmussen 
(Wesley's deposition, p. 17). Inasmuch as the vehicle 
was a hired automobile and Dennis was driving the same 
with his father's permission, he was an insured within the 
meaning of division (2) of Insuring Agreement num-
ber III. 
Because the vehicle was a hired automobile and he-
cause Dennis was driving the same with his father's per-
mission, Wesley, as ''any person'', was an insured 
within the meaning of division (2) of Insuring Agreement 
III if he was ''legally responsible for the use'' of the 
,·ehicle by Dennis. 
The material provisions of Section 41-2-10 and 41-2-22, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, read as follows: 
"41-2-10 ... (b) Any negligence or willful mis-
conduct of a minor under the age of eighteen 
years when driving a motor vehicle upon a high-
way shall be imputed to the person who has signed 
the application of such minor for a permit or li-
cense, which person shall be jointly and severally 
liable with such minor for any damages caused 
by such negligence or willful misconduct ... '' 
"41-2-22. Owner liable for negligence of minor. 
- Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or 
knowingly permitting a minor under the age of 
eighteen years to drive such vehicle upon a high-
way, and any person who gives or furnishes a mo-
tor vehicle to such minor, shall be jointly and 
severally liable with such minor for any dam-
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ages caused by the negligence of such minor in 
driving such vehicle.'' 
Wesley signed Dennis' driver's license application 
and he also furnished the vehicle to Dennis. Wesley's 
liability was alleged in all three complaints, Exhibits P 3, 
P4 and P 5, based upon these facts and the above Utah 
statutes. This brief demonstrated under Point I that 
whether or not Wesley may ultimately be found liable is 
not material to the issue of coverage since the allegations 
of the complaint govern. Wesley was clearly an "in-
sured" within the meaning of division (2) of Insuring 
Agreement III. 
POINT V. 
UNDER CONTROLLING UtAH PRECE-
DENTS AN INSURANCE POLICY IS CON-
STRUED LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE 
INSURED AND IN CASE OF UNCERTAINTY 
OR DOUBT, STRICTLY AGAINST THE 
COMPANY. 
Under ordinary rules of contract interpretation the 
defendant's policy plainly and unambiguously afforded 
coverage to Wesley and Dennis. In the event, however, for 
any reason, that this court may believe the policy to be 
ambiguous or uncertain, the court's attention is directed 
to the special rules governing construction of insurance 
contracts. 
It is well established that insurance policies should 
be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly 
against the insurance company. Richards v. St(J!Yldard 
Ace. Ins. Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 Pac. 1017, (1921); Gibson 
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v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 84 Utah 452, 36 P. 
2d 105, 109 (1934); Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 1, 236; 
Commercial Credit Corportaion v. Premier Insurance Co., 
12 Utah 2d 321, 366 P. 2d 476 (1961). 
As stated in the concurring opinion of Judge Larson 
in Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 94 Utah 532, 
72 P. 2d 1060, 1073 (1937), rehearing den. 94 Utah 570, 
80 P. 2d 348 (1938): 
"Insurance policies, while in the nature of 
written contracts, are not prepared after negotia-
tions between the parties, to embrace the terms at 
which the parties have arrived in their negotia-
tions. They are prepared beforehand by the in-
surer, and the company solicitors then sell the 
insurance idea to the applicant. Normally, the de-
tails and provisions of the policy are not dis-
cussed, except that the particular form of policy 
is best suited to give the appliC'flnt the protection 
he seeks. If he reads the policy he is generally 
not in a position to understand its details, terms, 
and meaning except that, in the event against 
which ·he seeks insurance, the company will pay 
the stipulated sums. He seldom sees the policy 
until it has been issued and is delivered to him. 
He signs an application blank in which the policy 
sought is described either by form number or by 
a general designation, pays his premium, and in 
due course thereafter receives either fom the 
agent or through the mails, his policy. Many of 
its terms and all of its defenses and super-refine-
ments he has never heard of and would not under-
stand them if he read them. Such fact is evident 
from the fact that cases like this arise where law-
yers and courts disagree as to what such provi-
sions mean. In fact, there are about as many 
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different constructions by the courts of terms such 
as those involved here as there are insurance com-
panies issuing such policies. For this reason the 
rule of strictissimi juris has been applied almost 
universally to insurance ·contracts, and this juris-
diction like many others, has declared in favor of 
a liberal construction in favor of the insured to 
accomplish the purpose for which the insurance 
was taken out and for which the premium was 
paid.'' Colo vas v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New 
York, 83 Utah 401, 28 P. (2d) 607; Gibson v. Equi-
table Life Assur. Society of United States, 84 Utah 
452, 453, 36 P. (2d) 105." 
It is well established in Utah that in case of ambig-
uity, uncertainty, or doubt, the terms of the policy will 
be construed strictly against the company and in favor 
of the insured. Since the company writes the insurance 
agreement, it has the burden of wording the agreement r~ 
so that it will be clearly understood as to what benefits 
the insured is to derive. Colovas v. Home Life Insurarnce 
Co., 83 Utah 401, 28 P. 2d 607, 610 (1934). 
In Kavanagh v. The Maccabees, 66 Utah 307, 242 
Pac. 403, 404-5, the Utah Supeme Court said: 
''The general, indeed, we may say the almost 
universally accepted, doctrine of both the Eng-
lish and American courts is that, in case the mean-
ing of the language used in insurance contracts is 
ambiguous or doubtful respecting the rights of the 
insured, such doubt or ambiguity must be resolved 
in favor of the insured and against the insurer .•. 
The consequences of the burden of· the ·ambiguity 
must fall upon the insurer who is responsible for 
the ambiguous language . . . 'Policies are con-
tracts, elaborately and shrewdly prepared in ad-
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vance by calculating and astute experts. They are 
tendered, ready made, to and accepted out of hand 
by plain people, the uninformed and unlearned, the 
unwary and confiding. Insurance policies swarm 
with intricate, technical provisions, stipulations, 
exceptions, conditions, provisos, limitations, hedg-
ing liability about and looking to its avoidance. It 
is not singular then that courts incline to pit ju-
dicial astuteness against the astuteness of the 
policy maker; the latter planting forfeitures in 
ambush or open, and the former striving to avoid 
them.' '' (Emphasis added) 
See also Fawcett v. Security Benefit .Ass'n, 99 Utah 193, 
104 P. 2d 214 (1940). 
CONCLUSION 
This case represents one more instance of a casualty 
company seeking to avoid its policy obligations. The ad-
mittedly complex policy, when the excess verbiage and 
obtuse organization is disregarded, nevertheless, in a 
simple, direct, and plain fashion affords coverage to W es-
ley for the accident in question by its first two insuring 
agreements and the first line of the third insuring agree-
ment. No other policy provision removes this coverage. 
Wesley also achieves coverage, along with his son Dennis, 
for the accident in question by virtue of division (2) 
of the third insuring agreement, and again no policy 
provision removes this coverage. The policy is an ex-
tremely broad-form-coverage and audit-type policy, not 
requiring advance disclosure of all exposures, or the spe-
cific exposure in issue. Minimum premiums were paid for 
such exposure and coverage resulted. An audit disclosed 
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an additional premium may be due therefor. An issue 
reserved for trial is the amount of such premium. 
The defendant clearly has and had a duty to de-
fend respondents, to pay all judgments rendered or to 
be rendered against them, and to reimburse them for their 
costs, expenses, and legal fees incurred or to be incurred 
in defending actions against them, all arising from the 
accident involved. The judgment of the District Court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submtited, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & 
MANGUM 
JOHN K. MANGUM 
206 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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